My scholarship focuses on the separation of powers and on the design of democratic institutions. I am particularly interested in normative arguments about institutional design, although I also write about constitutional interpretation. In addition to publication-ready working papers, I have ongoing research on a number of topics.
Book Manusript
My book manuscript, Madison’s Mistake: Restoring the Separation of Powers, develops a theory of the separation of powers as distinct from—and indeed antithetical to—the traditional Madisonian idea of checks and balances. I argue that the principle of separation of powers requires legislative supremacy, such that the legislature must have adequate control over the subordinate branches in order to prevent separation of powers from devolving into checks and balances. I also argue that the separation of powers enables a synthesis of competitive democracy and deliberative democracy, because the site of competitive democracy is the legislature while the appropriate site of deliberation is the administrative process. I theorize deliberative procedure as a distinctive mechanism of accountability, and I argue that constitutional due process contributes to this form of accountability. In the course of developing these arguments, I engage with the legacy of Madison (to some extent as mediated by Robert Dahl) in democratic theory. The analysis has implications for important current debates in democratic theory and institutional design, concerning the separation of powers, presidential power, and the scope of judicial review.
Separation of Powers & Constitutional Design
- The Separation of Powers Paradox: There is a neglected distinction between the constitutional principles of “separation of powers” and “checks and balances.” Judicial efforts to institutionalize the separation of powers through constitutional doctrine often instead effectuate the opposite principle.
- Due Process and Democratic Process: Due process doctrine has the potential to institutionalize separation of powers values—including political accountability—better than recent doctrinal innovations that have focused on strengthening presidential control over administration.
Law of Democracy
- Political Antitrust under Plurality Voting: State regulation of primary elections entrenches the dominant (Republican and Democratic) parties by encouraging political entrepreneurs to operate within the dominant party structures rather than organizing third-party challenges. Alternatives primary election structures could foster more inter-party political competition even while respecting the Duverger’s Law constraint on party proliferation.
- Traditional Gerrymandering Principles: Election law and theory misunderstands gerrymandering, by focusing on partisan advantage rather than a dearth of competitiveness as the normative problem. Courts bless “traditional redistricting principles” that are really the principles of bipartisan gerrymanders: in particular, respecting subdivision lines, preserving “communities of interest,” and sometimes even protecting incumbents. Leading mathematical measures of gerrymandering such as the “efficiency gap” also fail to identify bipartisan gerrymanders, because bipartisan gerrymanders employ packing and cracking on both sides that balances out. But doubling the amount of packing and cracking makes such a redistricting plan more, not less objectionable.