I am currently drafting several articles on separation of powers theory that stem from my dissertation work. One of these articles (The Separation of Powers Paradox) examines the distinction between “separation of powers” and “checks and balances,” exposing the tensions that arise from judicial efforts to institutionalize the separation of powers through constitutional doctrine. Another (Due Process and Democratic Process) examines the potential for due process doctrine to institutionalize separation of powers values—including political accountability—better than current doctrinal innovations focusing on strengthening presidential control over administration.

I am also studying the regulation of political parties, focusing in particular on how state regulation of primary elections entrenches the dominant parties by encouraging political entrepreneurs to operate within the dominant party structures rather than organizing third-party challenges—and on how alternatives primary election structures could foster more inter-party political competition even while respecting the Duverger’s Law constraint on party proliferation.

Additional ongoing projects examine the constitutional distinction between “Officers of the United States” and legislators, the misunderstood contours of impermissible “legislative self-delegation,” and the absence of a compelling justification for bicameralism.